

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
WHAT HAPPENED TO OPERATIONAL ART?

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the navy.

Signature: 

08 February 2000

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20000623 042
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Operation Allied Force: What Happened to Operational Art? (U)			
9. Personal Authors: LCDR Joseph J. Leonard, USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 8 Feb 2000	
12. Page Count: 31		12A Paper Advisor (if any):	
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Operational Art; planning; joint operations; guidance; direction; joint doctrine			
15. Abstract: Operational Art is the very heart of military planning. This is understandable and quite necessary, given the emphasis on joint operations in today's military. Despite the knowledge of the importance of operational art, leaders have failed to provide planners with the proper guidance and direction needed to succeed. The current dialogue regarding the success of Operation Allied Force has thus far brought a number of controversial arguments and compelling conclusions. To help explain this apparent contradiction and to suggest explanations why the tenets of operational planning are sound and still relevant in today's military operations, an analysis of the major events of Operation Allied Force is developed.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

ABSTRACT

Operational art is the very heart of military planning. This is understandable and quite necessary, given the emphasis on joint operations in today's military. Despite the knowledge of the importance of operational art, leaders have failed to provide planners with the proper guidance and direction needed to succeed. The current dialogue regarding the success of Operation Allied Force has thus far brought a number of controversial arguments and compelling conclusions. To help explain this apparent contradiction and to suggest explanations why the tenets of operational planning are sound and still relevant in today's military operations, an analysis of the major events of Operation Allied Force is developed. This analysis is developed by synthesizing existing literature on operational planning with a prior understanding of the major events that occurred throughout the year long planning effort and the 78 day execution of Allied Force.

The theory of operational planning can be distilled into six key concepts that are ingrained in joint doctrine. This analysis points towards both the complexities of operational design and its likelihood for application in the future. Recommendations for dealing with problems at the strategic/operational levels are discussed and include: an increased awareness of strategic/operational guidance; an increased awareness of the desired end state; a more rigid approach towards defining political/military objectives; correct identification of the enemy's center of gravity; direction of axis and development of the proper operational idea

INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that the efforts during Operation Allied Force were a success. However, the real question planners must debate is what happened to Operational Art? Operation Allied Force was without question a one-sided conflict in favor of NATO. Assembling and maintaining the cohesion of the NATO alliance, integrating over nine hundred aircraft from multiple nations, and sustaining a complex integrated air operation, the alliance unequivocally won the conflict with no casualties while the Serbian forces suffered more losses and were effectively defeated. In the aftermath of such a confusing yet successful operation, it is worthwhile to assess the results to determine what allowed this success and to enhance the probability of future conflicts.

An analysis of Operation Allied Force requires a more practical and functional evaluation of the concept of operational art in an operational planning framework. A review of the major events shows several major characteristics relevant to the operational-design construct. First is an ability to create strategic guidance for operational-level plans and to conduct a war at the operational level which maintains strategic aims. This can be interpreted as the ability to generate operational plans which rather than maintaining a tactical focus encompass the strategic objective. A plan for major operation or campaign is based on a number of considerations, collectively called operational design, which ensure one's own forces are employed in a coherent manner and focused on the assigned operational or strategic goals.¹

A synthesis of operational planning can be distilled in six key elements or concepts of operational design:

1. Strategic and operational guidance
2. Desired end state
3. Objectives
4. Identification of enemy critical factors (centers of gravity)
5. Direction or axis
6. Operational idea or scheme

This short list does not represent a total listing of what is involved in the overall operational art framework. Rather, it is a basic framework to help understand the complex subject of operational planning. A thorough understanding of these concepts and their characteristics goes a long way in understanding the planning difficulties encountered during Operation Allied Force.

Joint Pub 1-02, defines operational art as "...the skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives within the theater through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles...in its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where and for what purpose major forces will fight." Detailed planning in an operational art framework is absolutely essential for any military action to succeed. If the scope and concept of the planned operation does not satisfactorily address the adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine in an operational art framework to accomplish the mission, the entire plan is placed in jeopardy.

Space precludes a full review of Allied Force from every operational art perspective. Therefore, this examination will focus only on the operational design; to assess the extent of operational art practiced. Specifically, it will address the operational objectives and how they changed throughout the operation, the miscalculation of the

centers of gravity, and how the operational objectives and the end state were out of synch. The second part of the analysis will reveal that planning for the conflict was flawed in that the operation, particularly the employment of air power in the principle of war contexts of concentrated mass and its application in an operational direction/axis framework was far from flawless.

How it all Started

To understand how the operation was developed we have to look to the past to see how NATO conceptualized its response to the emerging conflict in Kosovo. In the spring of 1998, after a large number of Kosovar Albanians were displaced from Kosovo, planning was directed to establish a quick response strike into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The limited air strikes were designed to demonstrate NATO's resolve and to lay down a marker to show that the European community would not tolerate the ethnic cleansing or the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

Planning for Operation Allied Force began in June of 1998 following the outbreak of hostilities between the Yugoslavian Army (VJ), Ministry of Interior Forces/Special Police (MUP), and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), resulting in the displacement of several hundred thousand Kosovar Albanians. Following the reports of ethnic cleansing and the growing number of displaced persons, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199 of 23 September 1998 was approved, which required the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. This provided NATO with the justification to plan and execute a contingency operation into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The result was CONOPLAN 10601 (Appendix A) which consisted of a five

phase air campaign and would be implemented in sequence to support the political/strategic objectives.²

Objectives developed through Target-Centric Warfare

Target-centric warfare dominated the operational planning process. Between May and October 1998, a total of nine different strike options and air plans were developed to deliver a myriad of strike responses. Target-centric warfare was the result of an infinite number of restrictions placed on planners to reduce collateral damage and civilian casualties, followed by the notion that the operation would not last longer than four days (short war syndrome). The plan was aimed mainly at the Kosovo theater or ground forces which were conducting the ethnic cleansing operations and not at the strategic level or FRY leadership.

Target priority focused on supporting the US Air Force doctrinal tenets of destroying all elements necessary to achieve air supremacy and air superiority. Although these target sets proved to be successful in past conflicts (i.e. Desert Storm), in this instance, they did more to support US Air Force doctrine than it did addressing the realities of the situation in Kosovo.³ The plan eventually reflected a series of suitable targets selected to form objectives vice each individual objective directing the target planning. The result was a myriad of target options to support an infinite number of courses of action without achieving a desired end.

Strategic objectives are defined as the fundamental aims, goals, or purposes-towards which policy is directed and efforts and resources are applied whereas, the military objectives are the set of military actions to be taken to achieve the strategic

objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02, 1994) The NATO campaign focused at the outset on destroying, isolating and interdicting the VJ/MUP forces inside and around Kosovo, and preventing a continuation of Serbian aggression, or its intensification.⁴ NATO eventually outlined specific strategic goals (which were not strategic but operational objectives) to:

1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces;
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations.
5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations⁵

By employing this target-centric planning process, it was difficult to discern what the actual strategic and operational objectives were. Planners were left to develop target sets based on what they believed the CINCs intent wanted to achieve instead of accomplishing a specific objective. By comparing the strategic objectives above with the military objectives below, there is little difference between the two sets. These objectives were the foundation of the NATO plan yet failed to achieve a political/strategic objective.

1. Isolate VJ/MUP forces in Kosovo. (Interdict ground forces)
2. Degrade combat capability of VJ/MUP forces in Kosovo.
3. Reduce FRY capability to conduct and sustain offensive operations
4. Coerce FRY leaders to withdraw forces from Kosovo and cease hostilities
5. Enable unhindered NATO air operations. (Gain and maintain air superiority)

In a major operation the principle effort should be focused on the destruction, annihilation or neutralization of the enemy combat forces. However, by relying on

target-centric warfare it violated the essential element of identifying the correct strategic objectives in an operational art framework and led to the overuse of military air power.

Controversy over Centers of Gravity

Centers of gravity form the hub of all power and movements upon which everything depends...from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and/or will to fight. (JCS Pub 1-02, 1994). General Wes Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) (Appendix B) consistently demanded that Milosevic's 3rd Army is attacked as the main center of gravity. However, the NATO Air Commander Lieutenant-General Mike Short disagreed and never felt the 3rd Army was a center of gravity.⁶ This constant disagreement caused a great deal of animosity among commanders. General Short believed that the basis of the plan should attack strategic centers of gravity, at the higher levels of the military, political and economic systems. He believed this would achieve the effect of "destroying Milosevic ability to wage war by destroying targets critically important to his regime".⁷ However, SACEUR disagreed and noted that political constraints affected the alliance's operation and ability to conduct an aggressive air campaign.⁸

Many argue that the real center of gravity was the MUP forces that were responsible for aggressively removing ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Others argue that the VJ forces were just as critical as the MUP forces because they provided military support to the MUP and eventually would have had to be defeated if NATO elected to conduct a ground offensive. Although the guidance from SACEUR may seem clear, one miscalculation was made. Never in the history of air power has air power alone

succeeded in interdicting forces, and secondly removal of the VJ/MUP forces from Kosovo would only achieve an operational objectives and not the strategic goal. This position became the hallmark which caused NATO to fight an incremental air operation and violate the most essential principle of war –mass.

Regardless of the disagreement between commanders, if NATO had outlined a clear and concise set of strategic objectives, determining the center of gravity would not have been an issue. Although both arguments deserve merit, the confusion between identifying the proper center of gravity and the effects of outside restraints would stress the military forces and commanders as well as the Alliance throughout the 78 day combat operation. In the end, the operational planners were driven by a sensitive alliance structure, confusing objectives and an incorrect assessment of the center of gravity invariably resulted in prolonging the operation vice achieving a quick decisive victory.

Searching for a desired end-state

The third aspect of the operational planning process to be assessed is the critical element of translating political objectives into clear military terms. Successful planning requires clear political objectives, which must be then translated into a concise military mission with precise objectives and a well-defined end state. Having learned their lessons in previous military situations, notably Vietnam, the senior levels of the political and military establishment endeavored to ensure a proper political framework for the operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Confusion existed as to what constituted a satisfactory military end-state. The desired end-state refers to political, military, economic social, ethnic and other conditions

that would exist after the military strategic objectives are accomplished.⁹ It is also a critical factor in determining the scale duration and intensity of the employment of one's own forces.¹⁰ It is clear that the military strategic objectives were not in synch with the end-state and this can be observed by analyzing the change in NATO's objectives over the course of the war. On 23 March, NATO's objectives were to help to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international community and to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political solution.¹¹ By 23 April, the tone of NATO's objectives drastically changed to: verifiable stop of all military actions and the immediate ending of violence and repression; withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and para-military forces; stationing in Kosovo of international presence; unconditional and safe return of refugees and displaced persons; and establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the Rambouillet accords.¹² Finally, by 10 June, NATO's conditions for conflict termination reflected: immediate end to the repression in Kosovo; withdrawal of FRY military police and para-military forces; stationing of peacekeepers in Kosovo; and unconditional safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and their access to humanitarian aide.¹³

With the changing political objectives, the military objectives had to reflect ways of achieving the desired end-state. NATO's military objectives as of 23 March were directed at halting the violent attacks being committed by VJ and MUP and disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of Kosovo thereby supporting international efforts to secure FRY agreement to an interim political

settlement.¹⁴ The military objectives and the amount of firepower increased to support NATO's changing objectives. As the conflict went on longer and longer the intensity of military power increased, therefore proving the theory that the scale of military power applied is directly related to both the objectives and end-state.

Hostilities may cease because the end-state has been accomplished, because an equilibrium has been achieved, or because culmination occurred short of the initial aims of the campaign or major operation.¹⁵ By sustaining an unrestricted bombing campaign across the FRY, several factors contributed to Milosevic accepting the terms of NATO agreement: the destruction of Serbia's civilian and military infrastructure by an unchallenged NATO air operation or Russia's unwillingness to support Serbia's agreements to end the crisis.

The bombing campaign against the FRY is a clear example of the disconnect between the operational planning effort desired and General Clark's intent and is perhaps a result of the disparity of opinions addressed earlier. This disparity between Commanders objectives, center of gravity and restrictions in the use of air power was to have ramifications throughout the war.

Elements of Operational Scheme

The elements of operational idea or scheme should ideally seek to avoid discernable patterns, make full use of the ambiguity and deception, and should provide for speed in execution.¹⁶ Allied Force failed to consider any, if not all, of these features. The operational idea or scheme is the principle part of the operational design which should seek to balance the impact of friendly combat power with economy of force.

There are multiple elements associated with operational idea and rather than simply list each category, this examination will show how some of these were addressed during the planning process.

The use of deception and avoidance of discernable patterns was never applied at the operational level. In dealing with over nineteen nations, deception was nearly impossible. NATO was announcing the countdown to the start of the bombing operations, while aircraft were deployed to forward staging bases with a band of media announcing their arrival plane by plane. An inflexible air tasking order was developed in a way in which all assets were employed in a systematic order with little or no variation from day to day. Strike raids would deploy at the same time and place and enter from the same direction each day. The VJ eventually mapped the pattern of air raids and had become effective in targeting the NATO aircraft.

NATO had also eliminated any option of a ground offensive. Whether or not NATO would have used such an option, they failed to preserve an important operational lever that might have contributed to an earlier termination of the conflict. The elimination of one force or another is a critical flaw in the NATO planning and execution of Allied Force. If the air operation had failed then what would have been NATO's alternative? It would have taken months to assemble a force necessary to defeat the VJ force.

The speed of execution was also slave to the air tasking order process. Planners were unable to task air assets quickly enough to counter the VJ/MUP movements. Since there was no threat of a ground offensive, the VJ/MUP were able to operate in small

dispersed units. The Serbs therefore did not have to mass their forces. This allowed the VJ to operate freely from the NATO air attacks. It was not until the KLA offensive late in the operation which forced the VJ into the open making them vulnerable to the air strikes. This would then limit the ability of the air staff to plan a coordinated quick decisive strike against the VJ/MUP. The air planners were left relying on the Forward Air Controllers-Airborne (FAC-A) to target the ground forces and could only plan to target non-mobile strategic targets which gave the VJ/MUP ample time to relocate vital assets.

The linkage between the operational idea and scheme and the objectives can be not be overstated. Without a clear set of strategic objectives the operational idea or scheme will be flawed. As demonstrated in Allied Force, planners were forced to grasp at whatever opportunity came their way rather than having the ability to use operational planning to direct the outcome.

Select Principles of War

The application of mass must be concentrated at the critical time and place for a decisive purpose to achieve superior results. To be truly effective combat power must be applied in a concentrated dose (or overwhelming force) at a specific moment in time. NATO's application of incremental and slow use of available force was a pure violation of the Principle of Mass.

Between the start of combat operations and the termination of hostilities, the total number of aircraft tripled from 366 to 912 and would have continued to increase if Milosevic had not capitulated when he did.¹⁷ The overwhelming mass was directed at

two simultaneous air lines of operation—a strategic attack on Serbia itself and an operational/tactical attack in Kosovo.¹⁸ The operational objectives targeted Serbia's integrated air defense system, command and control structures, VJ Army and Ministry of Interior Forces, war sustaining infrastructure and resources and military supply routes. In Kosovo, the attacks were designed to degrade, isolate and interdict Serbian forces. By opening night, planners had produced 40 versions of an air war.¹⁹ In the end, NATO settled on a three-phase air campaign: Phase I, NATO would strike anti-aircraft defenses and command bunkers; Phase II would extend the strikes to Yugoslavia's infrastructure below the 44th parallel, well south of Belgrade. Only in Phase III would the alliance strike targets in the capital.²⁰

Air strikes during the first three weeks of the air war were not particularly intense. Of the 93,000 sorties flown by the end of the third week in April, about a month into the operation, only 2,750 were strike sorties. At this point, NATO was averaging only 150 sorties a day compared to the 1,600 per day average in Desert Storm and the attacks were failing to achieve their stated objectives.²¹

Over the next three weeks, the air operation increased considerably as more aircraft arrived particularly from the United States. The average number of sorties increased from 150 per day to 450-to-500 per day after mid-April and began focusing on Serb forces that NATO claimed were isolated in Kosovo.²² By day 56, NATO had claimed to have destroyed 31 percent of all Serb heavy forces in Kosovo, but Milosevic was not budging and the flow of refugees streaming out of Kosovo, where the real war was taking place, continued.²³

The application of mass during Operation Allied Force paints a clear picture of the dangers associated with the incremental use of force and ruling out all aspects of warfare. While political considerations always constrain war and will continue to do so, Commanders still had plenty of historical evidence testifying that the manner in which Allied Force was being conducted was bound to make it less than effective.²⁴ The application and distribution of force must always be used in a concentrated dose to achieve and maintain the shock effect both dynamically and psychologically. NATO failed to achieve an overwhelming shock value by bombing widely and intensely throughout all the FRY from the beginning.

Operational Direction/Axis

The plan for an offensive must geographically portray the direction or axis of intended advance. The area of operation's (AOO) physical characteristics, distances, and geostrategic position significantly affected the force composition and employment of air assets in several ways. To analyze the operational direction several factors need to be addressed. First, air assets were restricted to fly at 15,000 feet to avoid anti-aircraft fire and missile defense systems and second, ingress and egress routes were restricted to those countries supportive of NATO's actions. Lastly, the combination of water and airspace were limited in positioning and movements of the TLAM firing units, Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) and multiple aircraft carriers. This small space greatly restricted the deployment, concentration, and maneuver of fleet and air assets.

The operational direction/axis is indirectly related to the country's, alliance's, or coalition's geostrategic position.²⁵ By occupying the external position, NATO was able

to force the VJ/MUP forces to disperse preventing a major offensive against the KLA. Without the NATO alliance, planners would not have been able to employ the large numbers of aircraft and sorties. NATO's geostrategic position with basing in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Turkey provided the necessary airfields to execute the air war from multiple axes. Helms states; to be successful, forces operating from exterior positions must be numerically larger and more mobile than the forces opposing them.²⁶ Allied Force demonstrated an overwhelming military air force compared to the defending VJ/MUP forces.

The physical characteristics of Southeastern Europe are a space-limited area of operation. The area of operation includes the Adriatic Sea and the bordering countries of the FRY. Although the FRY occupies a significant area of the Balkans, Kosovo is only but a small portion of FRY territory. With this small area of operations, air operations were dangerously predictable (Appendix C). Air forces were initially restricted to ingress/egress routes through northern Albania and Montenegro. Planners were forced to place significant risks on pilots because of the limited air space. By the later stages of the air operation, multiple axes were being exploited. Where the initial ingress and egress routes through Albania and Croatia continued to be used, NATO planners expanded their attack directions through Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Turkey (figure 3). With the VJ army Operation Horseshoe (POTKOVA)²⁷ (Appendix D) in its final stages, NATO forces were able to direct a more concentrated effort towards the ground forces. With this expansion in multiple attack axes, planners were able to strike VJ/MUP forces from multiple directions keeping them off balance.

The most uncontrollable factor during Allied Force was the weather. Although there are many physical features to consider, the factor of climate became the most debilitating for planners and impacted the direction of attack in many instances. During the course of the 78 day operation, missions would be altered or re-routed either to the north or the south to avoid poor weather conditions. With the strict requirements of collateral damage imposed, planners were forced to task a larger number of precision-guided munitions than have been used in the past. Precision-guided weapons proved to be the most effective weapon of the air war, but they were certainly not the end all weapon. In many instances weather even affected the guidance systems of these hi-tech weapons and caused more than one to go astray.

With a minimum attack ceiling of 15,000 feet and poor visibility, it is a wonder any ground forces, armor or field artillery were destroyed. Weather forced NATO to cancel at least half of its total number of planned sorties on 39 of the 78-day campaign.²⁸ This experience is a clear lesson that the revolution in military affairs has not solved the problems regarding the unpredictable or uncontrollable factors of weather and that enemy forces will adapt to take maximum advantage of the cover provided by weather or other visibility problems.²⁹

Conclusion

The tenets of operational art and operational planning are sound. Although not employed in the most effective way in Allied Force, the foundation of operational art can never be more relevant than in today's military environment. The application of operational design analyzed in the Operation Allied Force framework revealed multiple

faults by Commanders and planners. With respect to the planning, the NATO staffs were clearly not up to the task, requiring assistance from US sources for the planning and execution of air operations. Significantly, it is argued that the strategic/political objectives were never properly quantified in the operational plan, such that the option to use overwhelming force to coerce Milosevic to abandon Kosovo nor was a plan to employ ground forces ever seriously considered.

The quick glance taken here clearly leads to the conclusion that one would be misguided to accept as fact that Allied Force was a modern example of the operational art. However, Allied Force serves as a testimony of the ability of NATO allies to overcome together significant challenges and bring to a successful conclusion the terrors of ethnic cleaning.

Recommendations

The debate regarding how successful Operation Allied Force was will be analyzed for years to come. Based on their evolving role in Europe, NATO must establish an operational art and operational planning forum in a continual process of conceptual analysis and exercise planning. One of the first issue to address is NATO's reevaluation of their operational planning structure. If they are to become the premier military organization in Europe, they must come to realize that the tenets of operational art and operational planning are essential for success.

- Since political restrictions prevented what airman considered the most effective use of force against the most lucrative targets from being attacked, an incoherent, piecemeal strategy evolved of "uncoordinated operational

planning". Random bombing is not an operational strategy. Attempting to attrite fielded forces, especially in this environment is an extremely difficult, time consuming process and will require an immense amount of air power. The most effective method is to attack the fielded forces in parallel, simultaneous manner early on, before they have time to disperse and conceal themselves.

- Multiple axes of attack must always be considered if not exploited. Limiting forces to a single axes of attack places pilots at unnecessary risk and provides the enemy with a predictable direction of attack for him to counter.
- Air power played a significant role; however, it is unclear whether NATO could have coerced Milosevic before the alliance or civilian political will collapsed. To be effective, air power should be employed in a synergistic manner with all of the other instruments of military and national power.
- Commanders unfamiliar with the air power employment treated it like ground forces and assumed more was better; shifted the focus to direct attrition of ground forces and seemed to think that if enough artillery/armor were destroyed that it would achieve the coercive goals.
- Target-centric warfare is not a substitute for the proper development of objectives across all levels of war. This includes the purpose of the levels of war and the responsibility for all commanders. NATO must provide training to decision-makers and planners involved in the deliberate and crisis action

positions. It is imperative that planners understand the framework of operational art and apply its tenets to whatever situations dictate.

APPENDIX A

CONOPLAN 10601

- Phase Zero – During Phase 0, released on 20 January 1999 as a political signal, air forces of NATO were shifted for the accommodation of practice flight operation to their operational airfields.
- Phase One – Conduct limited air operations, such as air strikes against designated militarily significant targets. Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999 with attacks on the integrated air-defense system (e.g. weapon systems, radar facilities, control devices, airfield/aircraft) in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Phase Two – Since the authorization of this phase on 27 March 1999 attacks extended to the security forces infrastructure in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depot, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). The authorization of this phase took place with the unanimous resolution of the NATO allies.
- Phase Three – The focus of this phase, which was not authorized, was the expansion of the air operations against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [24 Apr. 1999 NATO Press Conference] By a month into the air campaign it became apparent to NATO that a constrained, phased approach was not effective. At the insistence of US leaders, NATO widened the air campaign to produce the strategic effects in Serbia proper. At the April NATO Summit SACEUR was given the flexibility to strike at additional targets, within the existing authority of phase 1 and phase 2 of the operation that were necessary to keep the pressure up, both on the tactical side in Kosovo and on the strategic side elsewhere in Yugoslavia.
- Phase Four – *[support of stabilization operations?]*
- Phase Five – *[redployment operations?]*³⁰

The CONOPLAN was designed to provide a systematic approach to the operation at the same time provide the political leadership with a comfortable feeling of control. At the end of a phase SACEUR was required to gain NAC approval before moving to the next phase. In the end only two combat phases were ever approved. The initial strike plans directed TLAM/CALCM and stealth aircraft at a limited number of targets to demonstrate NATO's resolve in conducting offensive combat operations.


APPENDIX B

US/NATO Command Structure



US forces in Europe, though deeply interrelated to the NATO command structure, are not exclusively dedicated to NATO. The distinction is achieved through the operation of two separate command structures—the United States European Command (EUCOM) for US forces and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for NATO Commands—with commanders serving several principle elements within the two structures. During Allied Force the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR/USCINCEUR) directed the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) for NATO Forces who also commands US Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) as the overall operational commander for executing Operation Allied Force and US Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. All air operations were directed/coordinated by Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) for NATO forces who also commands US 16th Air Force and Commander, Striking Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH) for NATO forces who also commands the US Sixth Fleet and is the cruise missile executive agent.

With this basic understanding of the complexity of the US-NATO command structure, one can begin to consider the potential dangers in having two separate command structures. Although improvements in the use of network systems allowed the commanders to exchange information and communicate more rapidly, having two independent command systems proved awkward and added delays to the execution process. While having two command and control structures might be sufficient during a

very specific, limited operation, the wide range of military/political responsibilities placed on commanders' make this option militarily unsound



Direction of Attack Axes




APPENDIX D

OPERATION HORSESHOE (POTKOVA)

Principal purpose of the " Operation Horseshoe " is Neutralization of the UCK in Kosovo. Driving out the Kosovar Albanian population with the target of regional demographic modifications by force are obviously constituent of the plan.³¹

At the end of March, when Operation Allied Force commenced, Operation Horseshoe was in full course. The UCK turned all operation zones into the defensive, the number of the refugees rose dramatically. During the NATO bombing operation the Serbian forces were situated in the west in the Pec – Djakovica region. The KLA fought from the eastern part of Albania and a border war pursued until the end of Operation Allied Force.

The direction of attack attempted to inflict damage on the VJ/MUP along thier primary axes. The major emphasis became the lines of communication (LOC), the only way the VJ/MUP could move forces because of the mountainous terrain.



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